Breach of Promise to Marry: Drawing the Line on Criminal Liability
Atty. Donna Mae Pearl C. Dumaliang
Atty. Rhenelle Mae O. Operario
AUGUST 2026
A wedding is often described as one of the most significant milestones in a person’s life. Long before the ceremony itself,
there are usually plans to be made, families to inform, invitations to send, and expectations to build. For many couples, the decision to marry is not
confined to the two individuals involved. It is shared with their families, friends, and communities, making the promise of marriage not merely a
private declaration of love, but a commitment around which people begin to organize their lives.
But what happens when that promise is suddenly withdrawn?
A canceled wedding is ordinarily regarded as a personal tragedy. While the emotional consequences may be profound, the law has traditionally drawn a line between heartbreak and legal injury. Under Philippine jurisprudence, “a mere breach of promise to marry is not, by itself, an actionable wrong.” This principle has been settled for decades.
The rule traces its roots to Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals 1, where the Supreme Court explained that the present Civil Code deliberately omitted the provisions of the former Spanish Civil Code that recognized actions for breach of promise to marry. The omission was understood as reflecting the legislative intent not to recognize such breach as an independent actionable wrong. The doctrine was subsequently reiterated in Estopa v. Piansay, Jr. 2 and Baksh v. Court of Appeals 3. Thus, under the traditional rule, the law does not compel a person to marry merely because a promise to marry was previously made, nor does it automatically impose liability when that promise is broken.
Yet, Philippine jurisprudence has never treated the subject as entirely devoid of legal consequences.
In Wassmer v. Velez, 4 the Supreme Court was confronted with a particularly striking situation. The parties had already made extensive preparations for their wedding. A marriage license had been secured. Wedding invitations had been printed and distributed. Dresses had been purchased, bridal showers had been held, gifts had been received, and even the matrimonial bed had been bought. Then, only two days before the scheduled wedding, the groom-to-be withdrew from the marriage.
The Court did not declare that a breach of promise to marry had become actionable. Rather, it distinguished between the broken promise itself and the circumstances surrounding it. Applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, 5 the Court held that the manner in which the promise was broken may give rise to liability when it is contrary to good customs. As the Supreme Court explained:
But what happens when that promise is suddenly withdrawn?
A canceled wedding is ordinarily regarded as a personal tragedy. While the emotional consequences may be profound, the law has traditionally drawn a line between heartbreak and legal injury. Under Philippine jurisprudence, “a mere breach of promise to marry is not, by itself, an actionable wrong.” This principle has been settled for decades.
The rule traces its roots to Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals 1, where the Supreme Court explained that the present Civil Code deliberately omitted the provisions of the former Spanish Civil Code that recognized actions for breach of promise to marry. The omission was understood as reflecting the legislative intent not to recognize such breach as an independent actionable wrong. The doctrine was subsequently reiterated in Estopa v. Piansay, Jr. 2 and Baksh v. Court of Appeals 3. Thus, under the traditional rule, the law does not compel a person to marry merely because a promise to marry was previously made, nor does it automatically impose liability when that promise is broken.
Yet, Philippine jurisprudence has never treated the subject as entirely devoid of legal consequences.
In Wassmer v. Velez, 4 the Supreme Court was confronted with a particularly striking situation. The parties had already made extensive preparations for their wedding. A marriage license had been secured. Wedding invitations had been printed and distributed. Dresses had been purchased, bridal showers had been held, gifts had been received, and even the matrimonial bed had been bought. Then, only two days before the scheduled wedding, the groom-to-be withdrew from the marriage.
The Court did not declare that a breach of promise to marry had become actionable. Rather, it distinguished between the broken promise itself and the circumstances surrounding it. Applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, 5 the Court held that the manner in which the promise was broken may give rise to liability when it is contrary to good customs. As the Supreme Court explained:
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21…” 6
These cases establish a familiar proposition in Philippine law:
A broken promise to marry is not, by itself, actionable; but the circumstances surrounding the broken promise may give rise to an independent
cause of action when those circumstances constitute a legally recognized wrong.
For decades, the consequences recognized by jurisprudence have largely been discussed in the context of civil liability, particularly damages under the
Civil Code of the Philippines. 7
But a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court presents a more serious legal consequence.
On 29 July 2026, the Supreme Court issued a Decision in the case entitled XXX v. People of the Philippines, docketed as G.R. No. E-00648, which presents a particularly compelling set of facts:
But a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court presents a more serious legal consequence.
On 29 July 2026, the Supreme Court issued a Decision in the case entitled XXX v. People of the Philippines, docketed as G.R. No. E-00648, which presents a particularly compelling set of facts:
XXX and AAA were in a romantic and sexual relationship. In April 2020, AAA became pregnant. The pregnancy was initially welcomed by both parties. Thereafter, the families became involved in discussions concerning the couple’s marriage. On May 28, 2020, XXX and his family went to AAA’s home, where both families agreed that the couple should marry. Arrangements were subsequently made for the couple to apply for a marriage license.
AAA, relying on the impending marriage, informed her family and friends about the plans.
XXX, however, failed to appear on the scheduled date for their application for a marriage license. AAA was left shocked and humiliated. The couple eventually proceeded with the application on June 11, 2020. But the following day, AAA discovered that XXX had withdrawn the marriage-license application.
XXX maintained that he had never expressly agreed to marry AAA and that the marriage plans had been initiated by their families. He likewise cited his health concerns and the illness of his grandmother as reasons for postponing the marriage.
The consequences upon AAA, however, were not limited to disappointment over a wedding that would no longer take place.
The evidence presented before the courts showed that AAA suffered significant psychological and emotional distress. A social welfare officer observed that she was shaking and emotionally distraught. Psychiatric evidence likewise showed symptoms including restlessness and suicidal ideation, with her psychological disturbance attributed to the postponed marriage and the anxiety associated with her pregnancy out of wedlock.
AAA, relying on the impending marriage, informed her family and friends about the plans.
XXX, however, failed to appear on the scheduled date for their application for a marriage license. AAA was left shocked and humiliated. The couple eventually proceeded with the application on June 11, 2020. But the following day, AAA discovered that XXX had withdrawn the marriage-license application.
XXX maintained that he had never expressly agreed to marry AAA and that the marriage plans had been initiated by their families. He likewise cited his health concerns and the illness of his grandmother as reasons for postponing the marriage.
The consequences upon AAA, however, were not limited to disappointment over a wedding that would no longer take place.
The evidence presented before the courts showed that AAA suffered significant psychological and emotional distress. A social welfare officer observed that she was shaking and emotionally distraught. Psychiatric evidence likewise showed symptoms including restlessness and suicidal ideation, with her psychological disturbance attributed to the postponed marriage and the anxiety associated with her pregnancy out of wedlock.
The case thus raises a question that sits at the intersection of family relations, human relations, criminal law, and the protection afforded to women
under Republic Act No. 9262: “When does a broken promise to marry stop being merely a broken promise?”
For many years, the answer would have been straightforward: it does not become actionable simply because the promise was broken. Hermosisima, Estopa, Baksh, and Wassmer all teach us that the law does not recognize the broken promise itself as the source of liability
But XXX v. People of the Philippines calls for a closer examination of the conduct surrounding the broken promise to marry in light of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act.
Under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, “The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through xxx (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman’s child/children.”
Jurisprudence requires the prosecution to establish: (1) that the offended party is a woman and/or her child or children; (2) that the woman is the wife or former wife of the offender, or has or had a sexual or dating relationship with him, or has a common child with him; (3) that the offender caused the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and (4) that such anguish was caused through the acts or omissions contemplated under the law. 8
It was against these requisites that the Supreme Court examined the circumstances in XXX v. People of the Philippines. The petitioner argued that applying R.A. No. 9262 to the case would amount to an improper expansion of the law because the conduct involved the withdrawal of a marriage-license application. The Court rejected the argument, emphasizing the protective nature of the statute:
For many years, the answer would have been straightforward: it does not become actionable simply because the promise was broken. Hermosisima, Estopa, Baksh, and Wassmer all teach us that the law does not recognize the broken promise itself as the source of liability
But XXX v. People of the Philippines calls for a closer examination of the conduct surrounding the broken promise to marry in light of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act.
Under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, “The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through xxx (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman’s child/children.”
Jurisprudence requires the prosecution to establish: (1) that the offended party is a woman and/or her child or children; (2) that the woman is the wife or former wife of the offender, or has or had a sexual or dating relationship with him, or has a common child with him; (3) that the offender caused the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and (4) that such anguish was caused through the acts or omissions contemplated under the law. 8
It was against these requisites that the Supreme Court examined the circumstances in XXX v. People of the Philippines. The petitioner argued that applying R.A. No. 9262 to the case would amount to an improper expansion of the law because the conduct involved the withdrawal of a marriage-license application. The Court rejected the argument, emphasizing the protective nature of the statute:
“The argument regarding the “improper expansion” of Republic Act No. 9262 must be rejected. The law is a protective statute; where an act – even one involving marriage applications – is used as a tool to inflict psychological trauma on a woman in a dating or sexual relationship, the law must be interpreted to hold the offender liable.”
The Court was careful, however, to distinguish the broken promise itself from the conduct that accompanied it. XXX was not penalized simply because he failed to proceed with the marriage.
Rather, the Court examined whether his conduct, under the circumstances established by the evidence, caused the mental or emotional suffering contemplated by Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court explained:
“The RTC and the CA did not penalize petitioner for the breach of promise to marry itself. Section 5(i) of the Republic Act no. 9262 specifically penalizes acts that cause mental or emotional suffering. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, penalized petitioner because his “willful” withdrawal of the marriage license – knowing the victim was pregnant and had already announced the union – constitutes a form of emotional manipulation and public humiliation that fits the definition of psychological violence.”
This is where the case departs from an ordinary dispute arising from a failed engagement. The Supreme Court found that the circumstances established by the evidence satisfied the
requirements of Section 5(i), and accordingly affirmed the ruling of the lower courts finding XXX criminally liable for psychological violence under R.A. No. 9262.
The significance of XXX v. People of the Philippines lies not in the breach promise to marry itself, but in the circumstances surrounding it. Where those circumstances satisfy the elements of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 and result in mental or emotional anguish, criminal liability under the VAWC Law may arise.
The question, therefore, is no longer simply whether a broken promise to marry is actionable.
The more important question is:
The significance of XXX v. People of the Philippines lies not in the breach promise to marry itself, but in the circumstances surrounding it. Where those circumstances satisfy the elements of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 and result in mental or emotional anguish, criminal liability under the VAWC Law may arise.
The question, therefore, is no longer simply whether a broken promise to marry is actionable.
The more important question is:
When can the circumstances surrounding a broken promise to marry constitute “psychological violence” punishable by R.A. No. 9262 or the VAWC Law?
And that is where the law draws the line: a person remains free to change his mind about marriage; what the law does not permit is for that decision, under circumstances falling within its scope, to become an instrument of emotional manipulation, humiliation, or psychological violence.
Thus, the legal consequence does not arise because a promise to marry was broken. It arises when the conduct surrounding that broken promise causes suffering that the law itself recognizes and seeks to punish.
Thus, the legal consequence does not arise because a promise to marry was broken. It arises when the conduct surrounding that broken promise causes suffering that the law itself recognizes and seeks to punish.
FOOTNOTES
*The views and opinions expressed are based on applicable laws, constitutional provisions, and/or jurisprudence in force at the time of writing, and do not constitute legal advice or an official stance on any political matter. Subsequent legal or factual developments may affect the relevance or applicability of the views and opinions herein expressed.